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FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION-ADJUDICATORY PROCEEDINGS-RECEIPT OF
EVIDENCE IN CAMERA-During an adjudicatory hearing pursuant to a complaint filed by the Federal Trade Commission, counsel for the Commission
offered as evidence some confidential documents subpoenaed from respondent. The hearing examiner, on his own motion, ordered all confidential documents placed in camera.1 Counsel for the FTC objected to the order and
filed an interlocutory appeal to the Commission. On the interlocutory appeal, held, error in part. Because these documents do not contain highly
secret business information they must appear on the public transcript, unless
tendered to the Commission and obtained subject to an express stipulation
that, if offered in evidence, they would be placed in camera. In order to
support an in camera ruling, respondent must show that public disclosure
would result in a serious, clearly-defined injury to its interests. H. P. Hood
& Sons, TRADE REG. R.EP.1[ 29461 (FTC 1961).
In today's economy, the secrecy of business data which relates to
promotional strategy, research and development, and manufacturing
processes can be essential, in certain industries, to the maintenance of a
lawfully advantageous or competitive position.2 Moreover, business concerns
are desirous of keeping confidential a variety of information in order to
avoid embarrassing criticism, treble damage actions, and direct prosecution
by governmental agencies.3 The activities of many parties, nevertheless,
threaten exposure of such confidential data to the public and especially to
business adversaries. For example, federal agencies4 and grand juries5
may subpoena confidential documents, and private parties also may seek

1 "[D]ocuments made subject to such orders are not made a part of the public record
but are kept secret and only respondents, their counsel and authorized Commission
personnel are permitted access thereto." Principal case at 37790.
2 See generally Furach, Industrial Espionage, Harv. Bus. Rev., Nov.-Dec. 1959, p. 6.
Especially important to competitors is information which concerns pricing, sales statistics,
cost data, promotional strategy, research and development, and manufacturing processes.
3 See BNA Antitrust &: Trade Reg. Rep., Nov. 28, 1961, p. B-1.
4 Clarke v. FTC, 128 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1942)
(FTC subpoena for confidential
documents enforced) • With respect to the powers of other agencies to obtain confidential
information, see generally 1 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw § 3.06 (1958).
5 Application of Radio Corp. of America, 13 F.R.D. 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) .
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them through the use of discovery procedures. 6 If an administrative agency
or a grand jury obtains such information during an investigatory hearing,
the confidential nature of the material is not endangered directly.7 The
public nature of the judicial process, however, limits the protection which
the courts are able to give to confidential data introduced as evidence.
Traditionally, it rests in the judge's discretion "to determine whether, to
whom and under what precautions" such documents should be made
available. 8 Although there is some confusion with respect to the scope of the
protection afforded, the courts apparently employ the in camera procedure
only if the documents reveal a secret manufacturing process.9
When the FTC institutes formal proceedings against a suspected
violator it sometimes becomes necessary to introduce as evidence a variety
of confidential data.10 The Commission's hearing examiners, in order to
protect businesses from unnecessary injury, had developed a rather liberal
practice of withholding confidential documents from the public transcript
through the medium of in camera hearings, although there is no express
provision in the rules for such treatment.11 In the principal case the
Commission critically considered this policy for the first time and, in the
process, severely limited its scope. Valuable trade secrets such as manufacturing processes or customer lists presumptively satisfy the newly
enunciated test and will receive protection from disclosure through an in
camera order.12 But with respect to other types of data, hearing examiners
6 See, e.g., Burroughs v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 12 F.R.D. 491 (D. Mass. 1952);
Eastern States Petroleum Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co., 27 F. Supp. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
7 Grand jury minutes generally are not available to private parties. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959) ; United States v. Procter &: Gamble Co.,
356 U.S. 677 (1958) • The FTC, moreover, has been denied access to them. In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, 30 U.S.L. WEEK 2219 (E.D:Pa. Nov. 14, 1961). Furthermore, under the
rules of the FTC all investigatory proceedings are nonpublic, 16 C.F.R. § 1.41 (1960) , and
other federal agencies have similar rules. See generally 1 DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 4,
§ 3.13. Once these agencies, however, acquire confidential information or documents,
the policies which govern their release vary from agency to agency. See id.
s E. I. Du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 103 (1917).
9 See Herold v. Herold China &: Pottery Co., 257 Fed. 911, 918 (6th Cir. 1919) ; Griffin
Mfg. Co. v. Gold Dust Corp., 245 App. Div. 385, 282 N.Y. Supp. 931 (1935) • See generally
4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.22 (1950) ; 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2212 (McNaughton
rev. ed. 1961) •
10 See principal case at 37792. Respondents in FTC proceedings have been required
to give testimony or produce documents which involve trade secrets in spite of their
objections. Clarke v. FTC, 128 F .2d 542 (9th Cir. 1942) • The failure, furthermore, to
produce such information when material to the inquiry may produce a strong presumption
of guilt. Charles of the Ritz Dist. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944) •
11 See National Dairy Prod. Corp., 55 F.T.C. 2069 (1959); American Cyanamid Co.,
55 F.T.C. 2049 (1958).
12 The FTC Act § 6 (f), amended by 38 Stat. 721 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 46 (f) (1958),
prohibits the publication of either "trade secrets or customer lists" by the Commission.
This limitation, however, does not preclude inclusion in the hearing transcript of
such material when it is relevant to the matter in controversy. FTC v. Tuttle, 244 F.2d
605 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 925 (1957).

1962]

RECENT DECISIONS

649

are not hereafter to grant in camera protection unless respondents show that
severe economic damage will result if the public record contains the document in question. Further, a mere showing of embarrassment, exposure to
treble damage proceedings, or the desire of competitors to gain access to
the documents for business reasons will not support an in camera order.
In justification of its new position, the Commission noted that the
restrictions placed on the hearing examiners' discretion with respect to
the receipt of evidence in camera may have two significant and desirable
effects. First, implementation of this policy assures a more comprehensive
public transcript.13 The documents and other evidence contained therein
will aid private litigants in treble damage actions founded on similar
grounds. 14 Second, the publicity accorded documents received as evidence
may act as an effective prospective policing device. Companies may avoid
illegal business activities because they will fear public exposure of confidential documents in later FTC proceedings. But it would seem that a
procedural policy justified on such grounds, since serving no apparent
judicial purpose, is initially open to question. In order to permit parties
to cross-examine opposing witnesses and view adverse evidence, general
judicial policy favors open and public adjudicatory hearings.15 Nevetheless,
this judicial attitude sanctions the in camera treatment of business secrets
which, under the Commission's newly enunciated policy, will be included
in the public transcript.1 6
Effectuation of this new policy depends somewhat on the number of
confidential documents free of any protective stipulation which the Commission obtains during a formal, non-investigatory hearing. The Commission frequently does not control the procedures invoked to procure
such documents.17 Some courts, perhaps with knowledge of the burdens
13 Any interested party may obtain a hearing transcript. 26 Fed. Reg. 6018 (1961) ,
amending 16 C.F.R. § 4.14 (£) (1960) .
14 Private parties face substantial difficulties when they seek to acquire confidential
documents in the possession of third parties. See E. B. Muller &: Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d
511 (6th Cir. 1944); Louis Weinberg Associates, Inc. v. Monte Christi Corp., 15 F.R.D.
493 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) ; Caldwell-Clements, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 12
F.R.D. 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Joseph A. Kaplan &: Sons, TRADE REG. REP. 1f 29193 (FTC
1960) • The FTC regularly refuses to produce confidential documents in its possession.
Mohawk Ref. Corp. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1959); Texas Co., 30 U.S.L. WEEK
2452 (FTC Mar. 9, 1962) • See generally Miller, Availability and Use of Non-Public
Governmental Records and Reports in Civil Litigation, 9 SYRACUSE L. REv. 163 (1958) ;
Comment, 36 B.U.L. REv. 118 (1956).
15 See E. Griffiths Hughes, Inc. v. FTC, 63 F.2d 362, 364 (D.C. Cir. 1933); 1 DAVIS,
op. cit. supra note 4, § 8.09.
16 Cf. FTC v. Bowman, 149 F. Supp. 624, 631 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 248 F.2d 456 (7th
Cir. 1957).
17 The Commission issues the subpoena, but if it is returned unsatisfied the federal
courts enforce it. FTC Act § 9, amended by 38 Stat. 722 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1958).
See St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208 (1961); Oklahoma Press Publishing
Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946) •
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which parties must bear in other respects during formal hearings,18 indicate
a distinct reluctance to enforce FTC subpoenas for confidential information
absent a stipulation to protect from injury the party contributing the
documents.19 The subpoena powers of the Commission, nevertheless, are
so broad that business concerns under investigation voluntarily contribute
many documents of a confidential nature to the FTC.2 Companies, however, ordinarily attach a stipulation to such documents which, if accepted
by the Commission,.:will protect the data from public disclosure.21 Although
there is no legal compulsion on the FTC to honor such stipulations, it
announced in the principal case that they would not be. violated. The
Commission, during nonpublic investigational activities, depends on the
cooperation of industry, rather than its subpoena power, for the production
of documents.22
If the FTC discontinued the policy of honoring stipulations, it perhaps
would find it necessary to apply to the federal courts to enforce an increasing
number of subpoenas when issued for confidential documents. The need
to take such action would place a heavy burden on judicial time and on
the Commission's financial and personnel resources. Finally, the FTC,
in view of the forces arrayed to protect the confidential nature of data
submitted to it, apparently can compel public disclosure only when it is
in direct control of the procedures under which such material is received
as evidence. Thus, hearing examiners do not accept confidential documents entered as evidence in defense of formal charges unless they appear
on the public transcript. 23 Parties unable to protect business secrets as a
result of this practice may forego any defense to the action, and accept a
consent order24 or a stipulation25 settled in private rather than risk the
unwanted disclosure wnich may occur during litigation.

°

Peter W. Williamson
18 See MAsoN, THE LANGUAGE OF DISSENT (1959) ; Kintner, Federal Administrative
Law in the Decade of the Sixties, 47 A.B.A.J. 269, 278 (1961); Editorial Note, 13 RUTGERS
L. REv. 315 (1958) •
19 FTC v. Bowman, 149 F. Supp. 624, 631 (N.D. Ill.), afj'd, 248 F.2d 456 (7th Cir.
1957); Menzies v. FTC, 145 F. Supp. 164, 171 (D. Md. 1956), afj'd, 242 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.
1957).
20 See 1960 FTC ANN. REP. 29-31.
21 See principal case -at 37794.
22 1960 FTC ANN. REP. 29-31.
23 Sperry Rand Corp., 1961 TRADE REG. REP. ,r 15468, request for interlocutory appeal
denied, TRADE REc. REP. 1f 15569 (FTC 1961).
24 26 Fed. Reg. 6015 (1961), amending 16 C.F.R. §§ 3.1-.4 (1960). See generally
1 DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 4, § 4.02.
25 16 C.F.R. § 1.54 (1960). See also 1960 FTC ANN. REP. 90. See generally 1 DAVIS,
op. cit. supra note 4, § 4.02.

